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INTRODUCTION
The Telecommunications Act of 1996' ("1996 Act") sets forth a na-
1. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) 56 (to be codified in scattered sec-
tions of 15, 18, and 47 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1996 Act]. The 1996 Act represents the most sig-
nificant change in U.S. communications law since the passage of the Communications Act of
1934, which established the FCC and provided for regulation of interstate radio and telephone
communications. See MICHEL CARPENTIER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSrION 4-5 (C.P.
Skrimshire trans., 1992). The major goal of the 1996 Act is to create a competitive, deregulated
environment for all forms of telecommunications, including local and long distance phone
service, cable television, broadcasting, and Internet services. See Dan Carney, Congress Fires Its
First Shot In Information Revolution, CONG. Q., Feb. 3, 1996, at 289. Some of the most significant
changes under the 1996 Act occur in the area of local telephone service. First, the 1996 Act
preempts all state and local laws that bar competition in local phone services. See 47 U.S.CA
§ 253 (West Supp. 1997). Second, the measure requires all local phone companies to allow the
.resale" of their facilities through the process of interconnection, gives competitors the rights
to use the incumbent local phone company's pole and conduits to set up transmission lines,
and requires that incumbent local phone companies allow customers to keep their local phone
numbers if they change to a competitor's service. See id. § 251. Third, the 1996 Act mandates
that local telephone companies offer a minimum package of local telephone services at rea-
sonable prices to ensure that all Americans have access to phones. The "universal service" re-
quirement forces the FCC to set standards for the type and level of services offered by all local
telephone companies in the United States. See id. § 254.
The 1996 Act also changes the way that long distance telephone service is offered in the
United States. Under the legislation, regional Bell Operating Companies ("BOC"), which are
prohibited from providing long distance service under terms of the AT&T consent decree,
have the opportunity to provide local service if they can prove to the FCC that they have
opened their local markets fully to competition. See id. § 271.
The 1996 Act also deregulates most of the cable industry, except for the basic level of serv-
ices that includes local and educational programming. See id. § 612. Additionally, the Act al-
lows BOCs to offer cable services through their phone transmission lines, permits telephone
companies to purchase cable systems in rural areas, and stipulates that local telephone compa-
nies may own up to ten percent of cable systems in urban areas. See id. § 572.
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tional policy "to provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national
policy framework... by opening all telecommunications markets to
competition .... One of the main goals of the 1996 Act is to in-
crease competition in local phone markets in the same manner that
the long-distance telephone market expanded following the breakup
of the American Telegraph and Telephone Company ("AT&T") .3 As
was the case in developing effective competition in the long-distance
market, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") asserts
that "moving customers from one local carrier to another rapidly will
be essential to fair local competition. 4
Although the increased competition in long-distance telephone
service has been largely positive, it also has spawned a practice
known as "slamming,"6 where a long distance telephone company
2. SeeH.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 113 (1996), reninted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 124, 124
(statement ofjoint Managers).
3. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982),afd sub
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) [hereinafter Modification of FinalJudg-
ment]. The Modification of FinalJudgment was the result of a consent decree between the De-
partment of Justice and AT&T. Under its terms, AT&T retained its interest in long distance
services and combined its BOCs, which provided local service, into seven regional holding
companies. Each holding company controlled local phone service in its geographic area. The
consent decree also allowed AT&T to retain control over Western Electric, which developed
various telecommunications devices, and also gave AT&T permission to enter the computer
market. See CARPENTnER, supra note 1, at 19.
4. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, F.C.C. 96-325, available in 1996 WL 452885, at *1 (Aug. 8, 1996) [hereinafter Inter-
connection Order]. The Interconnection Order discusses and implements national regula-
tions for competition in local telephone service. Under the 1996 Act, potential entrants into
the local telephone market have three options: (1) they can construct new networks to provide
local service; (2) they can use "unbundled elements" of the incumbent local phone company's
network, which allows competitors to buy only the portions of the local network that they need;
or (3) they can buy access to the incumbent phone company's "local loops," which provide
service from the phone company switching station to the customer's home. Se id. at *10-12.
Since the easiest way for a competitor to provide service in a local telephone market is through
the resale of local loops, the Interconnection Order seeks to establish national pricing guide-
lines and regulations requiring local phone companies to negotiate in good faith with potential
competitors for access to their networks. See id. at *12.
Additionally, the Interconnection Order also addresses many peripheral issues concerning
the rules requiring the resale of the facilities of incumbent local phone companies and provi-
dons for competitors to build new networks. These issues include access to rights of way, col-
lection of resources, and procedures for dialing parity, which allows a customer to switch from
one local phone service provider to another without having to switch phone numbers. See id. at
*13.
5. See infra note 32 and accompanying text (noting AT&T's drop in market share follow-
ing the MFJ, and the rise of other competitors in the long-distance market).
6. See generally Policies and Rules Concerning Unauthorized Changes of Consumers'
Long Distance Carriers, 10 F.C.C.R. 9560 n.1 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 LOA Order] (report
and order). The FCC officially defines "slamming" as "the unauthorized conversion of a cus-
tomer's interexchange carrier by another interexchange carrier, interexchange resale carrier,
or a subcontracted telemarketer." Cherry Communications, Inc., Consent Decree, 9 F.C.C.R.
2086, 2087 no.10 (1994) [hereinafter Cherry Consent Decree]. Although the exact origin of
the term 'slamming' is unclear, it appears that AT&T coined the term as a way of describing the
unauthorized switching of its customers. MCI described the illegal switches as "SWOPs"
(switched without permission), but the term never became popular. See American Telephone
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changes a customer's service provider without authorization. Since
the origin of effective long distance telephone service competition in
1984, the FCC has tried a number of strategies to limit the impact of
slamming, most of which have met with limited success.8 In just the
last two years, over a million consumers in the U.S. have fallen victim
to incidents of slamming.9 The recent dramatic increase in slamming
poses a threat to the continued development of the seventy-billion-
dollar-a-year long distance telephone industry 0 and it threatens to
cripple the development of emerging competition in the local tele-
phone market. New measures must be taken to protect consumers
against this practice."
This Comment examines the effects of slamming on the competi-
tive telecommunications market and explores the effect that provi-
sions in the 1996 Act may have in deterring this anti-competitive ac-
tivity. Part I traces the origin of slamming and reviews the FCC's
initial rules to promote competition in the long distance market fol-
lowing the AT&T divestiture. Part II examines some of the more re-
and Telegraph Co., Petition for Rulemaking, 6 F.C.C.R. 1689, 1696 n.5 (1991) [hereinafter
AT&T Petition] (notice of proposed rulemaking). "Slamming is a pervasive consumer prob-
lem that threatens to undermine the Commission's goal of fostering competition in telecom-
munications markets while protecting consumers from unfair or abuse practices by carriers."
RCI Long Distance, Inc., 11 F.C.C.R. 8090, 8104-05 (1996) (memorandum opinion and order).
7. The problem of slamming, however, is no longer limited to just telecommunications
services. With the advent of effective competition in other regulated utilities, such as gas and
electricity, there is potential for the unauthorized conversion of service in those areas as well.
See Dan Richard & Melissa Lavinson, SomethingforEveryone: The Politics of California's New Law on
Electric Restructuring, 134 No. 21 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 37,41 (explaining that California has already
adopted rules for the newly deregulated electric power industry that require confirmation from
a consumer, in writing or from a third party, before switching their electric power supplier).
8. See FCC Adopts 'Slamming'Prevention Rules, FCC WEEK, Dec. 16, 1991, available in 1991
WL 2617762, at *1 (explaining that the FCC adopted methods of verification). In November
1991, the FCC's Common Carrier Bureau's Enforcement Division received 99 slamming com-
plaints. See id. ByJune 1995, the Enforcement Division was receiving more than 700 slamming
complaints a month, despite a 1992 FCC Order imposing stricter regulations on marketing and
switching procedures used by long distance companies. "It is the No. 1 complaint category at
the commission," stated Kathleen Wallman, former chief of the FCC's Common Carrier Bu-
reau. See FCC Plans New Rules for Phone Service Promos, L.A TIMES, June 13, 1995, at D2. Some
state public utility commissions have received even more complaints. The Nevada public utility
commission, for instance, now receives more than 7000 slamming complaints a month. See The
Switch is on at Phone Companies, Cmu. TRIB., Aug. 21, 1995, at 6 (describing the volume of slam-
ming complaints).
9. See Michael G. Wagner, Long-Distance Phone Customers Being "Slammed, "LA TIMES, Sept.
1, 1996, at Al [hereinafter Wagner, Long-Distance Phone Customers] (explaining that unauthor-
ized switching of long-distance service often escapes consumers for months).
10. See id. As of September 1996, there were approximately 860 long distance companies
licensed to provide service in the United States. In fact, all an entrepreneur needs is $25,000
and a business plan to obtain a license. "We've made it ridiculously easy to get a license. The
joke around here is that all you need to do is send in two cereal box tops and 50 cents," com-
ments Larry McNeely, chief investigator for the California Public Utilities Commission. See id.
11. SeeCatherine Arnst, Hold the Phone-It's a Marketing Free-For-All, BUS. WFL, Feb. 19, 1996,
at 32 [hereinafter Arnst, Hold the Phone) (discussing marketing strategies of local telephone
companies).
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cent actions taken by the FCC to deter slamming. Part III examines
key provisions of the 1996 Act that address the issue of slamming.
Part IV describes why the 1996 Act fails to adequately protect con-
sumers. Finally, Part V details legislative changes that Congress
should enact to protect a competitive telecommunications market.
I. BACKGROUND: THE ORIGINS OF SLAMMING FOLLOWING THE
AT&T DWvESTrrURE
A. The AT&T Consent Decree and Bell System Breakup
The near monopoly over the U.S. telecommunications industry,
which AT&T had possessed since the invention of the telephone by
Alexander Graham Bell in 1876, came to an end onJanuary 1, 1984.
A consent decree between the Department of Justice and AT&T
12
stated that AT&T was to relinquish all of its interests in the twenty-
two Bell Operating Companies ("BOC") that provided local tele-
phone service.'3 The BOCs were spun off into seven separate re-
gional holding companies that would then have responsibility for
providing local service in their areas.14  The consent decree also
mandated that BOCs provide access to other long distance services
that were "equal in type, quality, and price" to the access provided to
AT&T.' The FCC implemented these equal access provisions
through a process of pre-subscription, which allowed each telephone
customer to choose their primary interexchange carrier from among
a number of competing long-distance carriers.1
6
B. Initial FCC Rules Regarding Presubscription of Customers' Long
Distance Interexchange Service
The FCC's first presubscription plan, which is generally referred to
12. SeeCARPENTIER, supra note 1, at 1-2. In 1969, the FCC began to allow companies other
than AT&T to set up their own interstate common carrier networks, following the approval of
an application by Microwave Communications, Inc. ("MCI") to provide service between Chi-
cago and St. Louis. Because consumers had to dial access codes to reach a carrier other than
AT&T, however, the use of these "other common carriers" ("OCC") was impaired. As a result,
by 1983 OCCs only represented about eight percent of the long distance market. See id. at 13.
13. See id. at 19.
14. See id.
15. Investigation of Access and Divestiture Related Tariffs, 101 F.C.C.2d 911 (1985)
[hereinafter Allocation Order]. "Equal access allows end users to access facilities of a desig-
nated interexchange carrier by dialing '1' only." Id. Customers can also gain access to other
long distance service providers by dialing "a five digit access code" (1OXXX), which will bypass
that customer's primary long-distance carrier for the duration of that call. See id.
16. See id. The BOCs were charged with implementing provisions for equal access, where
"technically feasible," by September 1986. See id.
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as the "Allocation Order,"' 7 required all long-distance carriers to have
a signed letter of agency ("LOA") from the customer before they
were allowed to submit a notice to the consumer's local telephone
company authorizing the conversion of long distance service to a new
provider.' The Allocation Order engendered a great deal of criti-
cism, however, from many of the new long-distance carriers seeking
to enter the newly competitive long distance market.' 9 The new en-
trants claimed that requiring signed LOAs before initiating a change
in service would severely restrict the development of competition in
the long distance market. In their view, many consumers would for-
get to return the signed LOA after orally agreeing to a change in
long distance providers.
After intense lobbying by new long-distance carriers seeking an
easier method of entry into the long distance market, the FCC modi-
fied its rules in the "Waiver Order"2 ' by stating that long-distance car-
17. See id. at 935. The Allocation Order was designed to enhance competition in the long
distance telephone market by establishing certain procedures for local phone companies to
follow when conducting their initial "presubscription" arrangements following the implemen-
tation of equal access. Under the presubscription process, customers select a primary long-
distance carrier that will carry all dial "1" only long distance calls. Under the Modified Final
Judgment ("MFJ"), local phone companies were allowed to continue to route the calls of cus-
tomers who did not select an alternative long-distance carrier to AT&T. See id. at 911. The FCC
generally viewed this "default" system as anti-competitive because many consumers failed to
return their "presubscription" ballots. Instead, the FCC chose to mandate a plan adopted by
Northwestern Bell in which all consumers who did not return presubscription ballots are as-
signed to long-distance carriers based on the same ratio as those who did return ballots. This
plan was designed to reward long-distance carriers who aggressively marketed their services by
allocating larger shares of the "default" customers who did not return presubscription agree-
ments. See id. at 912. The FCC also considered adopting a plan under which the long-distance
carriers would share all default customers equally, but later rejected that plan, stating that
"[there is no rationale for allowing long-distance carriers a larger portion of customers than
what they acquired through their own marketing techniques." Id. at 922.
18. See id. at 929. The FCC defines a letter of agency as "a document, signed by the cus-
tomer, which states that a particular carrier has been selected as that customer's 'primary inter-
exchange carrier.'" 1995 LOA Order, supra note 7, at 9560. The industry also refers to "letters
of agency" as "letters of authorization," "orders for long distance service," and "customer com-
mitments." See Policies and Rules Concerning Unauthorized Changes of Customers' Long Dis-
tance Carriers, 9 F.C.C.R. 6885 n.4 (1994) [hereinafter 1995 LOA NPRM] (notice of proposed
rule making).
19. See Investigation of Access and Divestiture Related Tariffs, 101 F.C.C.2d 935, 936
(1985) [hereinafter Waiver Order) (observing that the volume of long-distance carriers filing
for waiver of the Allocation Order illustrated the widespread criticism).
20. See id. at 938 (discussing AT&T's belief that customers' oral assurance would satisfy the
requirement that long-distance carriers obtain signed LOAs).
21. See id. at 935. In the FCC's Waiver Order, several local phone companies and long-
distance carriers requested clarification of FCC rules regarding the selection of primary inter-
exchange carriers, and whether an long-distance carrier must actually possess a signed LOA
before they are authorized to submit lists of phone numbers for conversion to the local phone
companies. AT&T, in particular, requested that the FCC allow long-distance carriers to convert
long distance service as long as the long-distance carrier has taken steps to obtain a signed LOA
as specified in the Allocation Order. See id. at 938. In its discussion of the merits of such a
change, the FCC restated its original rationale from the Allocation Order:. "[t]he IXC (long-
distance carrier] which has such signed letters of agency is protected from the effects of cus-
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riers could change a consumer's primary long distance connection to
their service as long as they had "instituted steps to obtain signed
LOAs. "22 Following the FCC's relaxation of the primary interex-
change carrier ("PIG") change rules in the Waiver Order, the Illinois
Citizens Utility Board ("Illinois CUB")"s challenged the FCC's con-
clusions, claiming that they did not provide sufficient protection to
consumers against unauthorized PIC conversions. The FCC denied
the Board's challenge, claiming that the Waiver Order procedures
protected consumers by ensuring that their local phone company
would not charge them for any PIG change that the consumers failed
to authorize by a signed LOA.25 The FCC did not, however, discuss
consumer inconvenience due to unauthorized changes, excess
charges on the part of the slamming long-distance carrier, or the ex-
tomer misunderstandings and from potential responsibility for unauthorized charges. The lo-
cal exchange carrier ("LEC") has available for review an easily authenticated document in re-
solving consumer disputes." Id. In reaching its decision that long-distance carriers can convert
consumer's long distance service as long as they "have instituted steps designed to obtain
signed letters of agency or confirmations of choice from the end user," the FCC appears to ig-
nore all of its earlier analysis. See id. at 942. If the "origins" of slamming are traced to any one
FCC decision, the Waiver Order is the prime candidate.
22. See id. at 942.
23. See Illinois Citizens Utility Board Petition for Rule Making, 2 F.C.C.R 1726, 1730 n.3
(1987) (memorandum opinion and order). "The Illinois Citizens Utility Board is an inde-
pendent, nonprofit consumer group established by the State of Illinois in 1983 to represent the
interests of Illinois residential and small business consumers with regard to telephone and
other utility matters. It claims 170,000 members." Id.
24. See id. at 1726-27. In its petition, the Board raises several issues involving possible con-
sumer confusion in light of the FCC's previous decisions in the Allocation and Waiver Orders.
First, it alleges that consumers were being unfairly charged for changes in their presubscribed
carrier when they submitted their long-distance carrier ballots. See id. at 1726. Second, it ar-
gues that many consumers had their primary interexchange carriers changed when they con-
tacted various long-distance carriers for information on their services and not for the express
purpose of making a change. See id. Its final contention was that long-distance cariers were
using aggressive telemarketing practices to entice consumers to change carriers and this was
causing confusion among many consumers. See id. CUB contends further that the FCC exac-
erbated this confusion by relaxing the requirement in the Waiver Order that long-distance car-
riers actually possess an LOA before submitting primary interexchange carrier changes to local
phone companies. See id. at 1726-27. Letters in support of the Illinois Citizens Utility Board
were submitted to the FCC by Consumers Union, Illinois Governor's Office of Consumer Serv-
ices, Illinois Office of Consumers' Counsel, Kansas Corporation Commission, Labor Coalition
of Public Utilities, Missouri Public Interest Research Group, New Mexico State Corporation
Commission, New York State Attorney General, North Dakota Public Service Commission,
Ohio Office of Consumer Counsel, Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, and
the Wyoming Public Service Commission. See id. at app. A. In the Illinois Citizens Utility Board
Order, the FCC responded to the first contention of the Board and its supporters by stating
that, "petitioners concerns appear to be based upon a misinterpretation of prior orders relat-
ing to changes charges." Id. at 1729. With regard to the second and third contention of the
Board, the FCC stated that it felt that informing consumers of their rights regarding billing
disputes as a result of unauthorized changes in service was a matter for state "public service
commissions and offices of consumer counsel," and that the Illinois Board's proposal for a bill-
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pense incurred by the BOGs and other independent local telephone
companies that were often forced to absorb the expense of switching
slammed consumers back to their original carrier.26
II. THE RISE OF SLAMMING COMPLAINTS AND FCC EFFORTS TO STOP
THE PRACTICE
After the release of the Waiver Order and the denial of the Illinois
CUB Petition, slamming complaints began to increase dramatically,
affecting nearly every segment of the market.27 Increasing numbers
of consumers began to complain that unscrupulous telemarketers
were switching the primary interexchange carriers without even at-
tempting to obtain a signed LOA, as FCC rules required.28 The long-
distance carriers also felt the negative effects of slamming, losing
many of their long distance customers as a result of unfair competi-
tion.2 Additionally, BOCs and other local telephone service provid-
ers faced additional burdens as a result of the dramatic increases in
PIC changes submittedY
A. The AT&T Petition to Revise PIC Change Rules
In January 1990, this situation came to a head when AT&T filed a
petition with the FCC to revise the PIC change rules.3 AT&T con-
tended that the FCC rules had resulted in a large increase in slam-
ming incidents among its customers.32 AT&T also filed suit against its
26. See, e.g., Policies and Rules Concerning Changing Long Distance Carriers, 7 F.C.C.R.
1038 (1992) [hereinafter PIG Verification Order] (deciding only on safeguards to protect con-
sumers from unauthorized switching); 1995 LOA Order, supra note 7, at 9560 (stating that the
Order is in response to the large number of consumer complaints related to unauthorized
changes of long distance services).
27. SeeAT&T Petition, supra note 6, at 1690 (discussing notice of proposed rulemaking).
28. See id. at 1689 (explaining that AT&T petitioned for revision of FCC carrier selection
rules due to increase in unauthorized switching).
29. See id.
30. See id. One of the most enduring problems of slamming is its impact upon local tele-
phone companies, which will likely only get worse. Ameritech, the BOC serving much of the
Midwest, estimated that about 26,000 of its customers were slammed in 1995. The problem has
become so severe that Ameritech has started putting notices in customers' phone bills asking
them to return forms that lock in their present carrier and disallow any changes without the
specific written permission of the customer. See Thousands File Forms; Long-Distance Switching
Deterred CHI. TRIB., Jan. 24, 1996, at 3 (describing positive consumer response to Ameritech's
precautionary measures to prevent slamming).
31. See AT&T Petition, supra note 6, at 1689 (accusing MCI of deceptive marketing prac-
tices and slamming).
32. See 1995 LOA Order, supra note 6, at 9561. Prior to the filing of AT&T's petition, MCI
had filed suit against AT&T, alleging that they had engaged in deceptive business practices.
The suit did not allege any incidents of slamming on the part of AT&T. See 1995 LOA NPRM,
supra note 18, at 6886 n.15. It appears that AT&T did not direct its petition towards individual
incidents of slamming per se, but rather towards the overall beating that it was taking in the
fiercely competitive long distance market. In 1984, AT&T controlled 90.1% of the long dis-
tance market, while MCI only controlled 4.5%. By 1990, AT&T's share had dropped to 65%
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main competitor, MCI, alleging that it was responsible for deceptive
advertising and the unauthorized conversion of AT&T's customers.ss
MCI had previously filed suit against AT&T alleging deceptive mar-
keting practices in this and other areas of concern34 In time, AT&T
and MCI settled their civil suits and jointly proposed that the FCC
adopt additional regulations concerning the conversion of consum-
ers' primary interexchange carriers. 5
B. The FCC's PIC Verification Order
In the PIC Verification Order, the FCC issued a new set of proce-
dures designed to substantially reduce incidents of slamming.s The
new rules required long-distance carriers to initiate one of four pro-
cedures to ensure that consumers' primary interexchange carriers
were not changed without their express authorization: (1) obtain the
customer's written authorization; (2) obtain the customer's elec-
tronic authorization by means of a toll-free number established ex-
clusively for that purpose; (3) have the customer provide oral
authorization to an independent third party; or (4) send the cus-
tomer, within three days of the requested primary interexchange car-
rier change, an information package, which must contain a prepaid
postcard allowing the customer to confirm or cancel the order, and
wait for fourteen days before submitting any primary interexchange
carrier change to allow the customer time to return the postcard. 7
and MCI's had risen to 14.2%. Additionally, by 1990, AT&T's advertising budget had grown to
$797 million, compared to the $60 million MCI spent that year. See Bruce Horovitz, Long Dis-
tance Overload, LA. TIMEsJan. 19, 1992, at DI.
33. See American Tel. & Tel. v. MCI Communications Corp., 736 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J.
1990) (acknowledging that AT&T filed a counterclaim against MCI).
34. See 1995 LOA NPRM, supra note 18, at 6886 n.15 (recognizing MCI's prior suit against
AT&T).
35. See PIG Verification Order, supra note 26, at 1039 (describing AT&T and MCI's
agreement to propose to the Commission certain safeguards that would protect consumers
from unauthorized switching).
36. See id. at 1046 (stating that the Order was adopted to protect consumers against unau-
thorized switching of their long distance company).
37. See id. at 1048-49. The PIC Verification Order also discusses a number of additional
procedures that commentators suggested as potential solutions to the slamming problem. For
example, the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio suggested that the FCC require long-distance
carriers to file regular reports detailing complaints logged with the FCC. In cases where a long-
distance carrier repeatedly violates FCC rules, a written LOA requirement for all primary inter-
exchange carrier changes should be imposed. Bell Atlantic commented that the FCC should
require all long-distance carriers to submit their primary interexchange carrier change records
to local phone companies upon request, in order to ease the burden on local phone compa-
nies in ensuring that primary interexchange carrier changes are not submitted fraudulently.
Some smaller long-distance carriers also stated that they believed the FCC's consideration of
the third-party verification proposal improperly favored larger long-distance carriers who
would be able to bear the increased costs of setting up a third-party verification center. Comp-
Tel and Convergent Communications both stated that third-party verification requirements
should bind only "large scale" long-distance carriers. See id. at 1041, 1048.
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While the PIC Verification Order did represent a concerted effort
by the FCC to specifically target slamming, the rules had little overall
impact in curbing incidents of slamming.3 From 1992, when the
FCC released its regulations, to 1995, incidents of slamming rose
dramatically 9 Much of the increase was attributed to LOAs40 that
were disguised as contest forms or requests for charitable contribu-
tions.4 ' Another questionable scheme involved checks, commonly
known as "inducement checks," that long-distance carriers sent out as
incentives, which automatically authorized conversion of long dis-
tance service for many uninformed consumers who signed and
cashed the checks.
38. In 1993, the FCC received more than 1700 complaints alleging unauthorized conver-
sion of long distance service. In 1994, that number grew to 2500. See 1995 LOA NPRM, supra
note 18, at 6885. By 1995, the number had ballooned to nearly 700 complaints a month, or
8400 a year. See The Switch is on at Phone Companies, supra note 8, at 6.
39. See 1995 LOA NPRM, supra note 18, at 6885.
40. The FCC's 1992 PIC Verification Order did not specify a set form for LOAs. Instead, it
prescribed the following guidelines:
No long-distance carrier shall submit a PIG [primary interexchange carrier] change
order to a[n] LEG generated by telemarketing unless and until the order has first
been confirmed in accordance with the following procedures:
1) the IX( has obtained the customer's written authorization to submit the order
that explains when a primary interexchange carrier is changed and confirms:
a) the customer's billing name and address and each telephone number to
be covered by the PIG change order,
b) the decision to change the PIG to the IXC, and
c) the customer's understanding of the PIG change fee.
PIG Verification Order, supra note 26, at 1048 (defining information required in written
authorizations).
41. One example of a deceptive LOA involves an authorization form used by Heartline
Communications, an long-distance carrier based in Texas. See Phone Company Switches Slammed,
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4, 1994, at 12. The form prominently stated at the top that they were
"Raising Funds for National Children's Charities," and further stated that" [t]wo percent of my
domestic long distance bill... will be donated to a national children's charity every month."
Id. In small print at the bottom of the form, it stated that people signing the form would have
their long distance service switched if they did not check a box next to the statement. See id.
Another deceptive LOA was disguised as a contest to win a free Chevrolet Camaro. See Wag-
ner, Long-Distance Phone Customers, supra note 9, at Al. Consumers filled out what appeared to
be a contest entry form and later found out they had been slammed because they did not no-
tice the small print at the top of the form that stated "Letter of Authorization." See id.
42. See Wagner, Long-Distance Phone Customers, supra note 9, at Al. The most flagrant ex-
ample of checks being used as deceptive LOAs was carried out in California by a Georgia long-
distance carrier, Sonic Communications. Sonic Communications sent out $10 checks that ap-
peared to be prize winnings. Unfortunately, many consumers did not read the fine print below
the endorsement line on the back of the checks that stated that their signature gave Sonic the
authority to convert their long distance service. Almost 100,000 consumers in California
cashed the checks. Additionally, the California Public Utility Commission found evidence that
Sonic targeted the checks to predominantly Latino communities where many residents did not
speak English. Complaints from the incident overwhelmed the commission and led to a ban
on Sonic as a long-distance carrier in California. See id. AT&T also used checks as an induce-
ment to get consumers to switch to their service, however, relatively few complaints have been
reported against that long-distance carrier. See 1995 LOA Order, supra note 6, at 9573 (noting
that some IXCs who use checks in promotional materials in a "non-misleading manner" have
received "minimal consumer complaints").
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C. The FCC's 1995 LOA Order
In November 1994, the FCC initiated, on its own motion, yet an-
other rulemaking docket to further clarify the LOA requirements
and specify what information inducement checks must contain to
serve as valid letters of agency.4 Specifically, the FCC sought to deter
certain "marketing practices" in which the "inducement is combined
with the LOA and the inducement language is prominently displayed
on the inducement/LOA form while the PIC change language is not,
thus leading to consumer confusion.""
In its 1995 LOA Order, the FCC moved to establish general stan-
dards for the form and content of LOAs, 45 and required that LOAs be
"separate" or "severable" from any promotional or inducement mate-
rial received.46 Additionally, the FCC required translation of LOAs
into the same language used in the accompanying promotional ma-
terials if the promotional materials are not in English, 7 and prohib-
ited the use of "negative option" LOAs, which require the person
signing the form to take some action to avoid having their primary
interexchange carrier switched.48 The new FCC regulations that re-
quired "severable" or "separate" LOAs excluded checks that serve as
LOAs, so long as the check clearly states that the endorsement consti-
tutes a change of long-distance carriers. 9 The 1995 LOA Order con-
cluded by stating that "although our evolutionary approach to the
'slamming' problem has generally been one of regulatory restraint,
we will not tolerate continued abuses.""
The FCC's bark, however, has been far more severe than its bite. A
43. See 1995 LOA NPRM, supra note 18, at 6885.
44. Id. at 6887.
45. See47 C.F.R. § 64.1150(e) (1996) (requiring LOAs to "be printed with a type of suffi-
cient size and readable type to be clearly legible").
46. See id. § 64.1150(c) ("[T]he letter of agency shall not be combined with inducements
of any kind on the same document.")
47. See id. § 64.1150(g) ("If any portion of a letter of agency is translated into another lan-
guage, then all portions of the letter of agency must be translated into that language.").
48. See id. § 64.1150(0 (LOAs "shall not suggest or require that a subscriber take some
action in order to retain the subscriber's current interexchange carrier").
49. See id. § 64.1150(d) ("[T]he letter of agency check shall contain, in easily readable,
bold-face type on the front of the check, a notice that the consumer is authorizing a primary
interexchange carrier change by signing the check."). AT&T and MCI strenuously oppose any
regulations by the FCC that would ban the use of combined inducement and LOA checks. See
1995 LOA Order, supra note 6, at 9570-71 (noting that opponents argue that such a rule may
be "unconstitutional"). Consumer Action, LDDS Long Distance, and Sprint contest the con-
tentions of AT&T and MCI. See id. at 9570 n.38 (identifying those who support proposal to
"separate the LOA from promotional material"). Sprint was vehemently opposed to the use of
combined check and LOAs, and stated that this combination has "the potential for outright
deception, or at the very least for leading to misunderstandings between consumers and carri-
ers." Id. at 9570.
50. 1995 LOA Order, supra note 6, at 9583.
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reading of the plain language put forth in the regulations reveals that
they require only that LOAs "be clearly legible and contain clear and
unambiguous language" that the consumer intends to change their
primary interexchange carrier.5' Thus, even with the FCC require-
ments mandated by the 1995 LOA Order, such as translating the
LOA and making it physically "severable" from any enclosed promo-
tional material, the potential for abuse still existed because the FCC
did not require a standard, separate LOA for all long-distance carri-
ers to use to execute primary interexchange carrier changes. 2 Addi-
tionally, the 1995 LOA Order took almost no action against induce-
ment checks, except to require that the primary interexchange
carrier change information be in "easily readable, bold-face type" on
both sides of the check.53 The net effect of the FCC's new slamming
regulations was minimal, at best, as slamming complaints reported to
the FCC rose to a new high in the early months of 1996.-
III. THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
A. Overview
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 presents the first major
change in sixty-two years in the way communications services are pro-
51. See47 C.F.R. § 64.1150(e).
52. The 1995 LOA Order states that the FCC "will allow IXCs the flexibility to design the
LOA in a manner that is complementary to their associated promotional material." 1995 LOA
Order, supra note 6, at 9566. The FCC took no action on requiring a standard LOA form even
though two of the largest BOCs, NYNEX and Southwestern Bell, asked the FCC to promulgate
such a regulation in order to combat the dramatic rise in primary interexchange carrier
changes submitted to local telephone companies as a result of slamming. See id. at 9567 n.28
(noting arguments in favor of requiring more controls and penalties to increase consumer pro-
tection). In rejecting a rule requiring standardized LOAs, the FCC relied mainly on First
Amendment concerns. See id. at 9567-69. In so doing, the FCC relied on somewhat question-
able analysis that inferred that a standardized LOA would impinge on the rights of long-
distance carriers to effectively promote their services. See id. at 9569 (theorizing that restric-
tions will not be placed on long-distance carriers promotional materials or campaigns). This
analysis, however, ignores the fact that long-distance carriers will still be able to use a variety of
promotional materials in soliciting new consumers. Additionally, the use of a standardized
separate LOA comports with Supreme Court rulings concerning the protections that must be
afforded commercial speech. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) (holding that "[tihe government may ban forms of communication
more likely to deceive the public than to inform it"); Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (concluding that it is permissible to
use some restrictions on the time, place, and manner of commercial speech, "provided that
they are justified without reference to the context of the regulated speech, that they serve a
significant governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample alternative chan-
nels for communication of the information").
53. See47 C.F.R. § 64.1150(d).
54. In 1995-96, more than one million customers in the United States had their primary
interexchange carriers changed without permission. SeeWagner, Long-Distance Phone Customers,
supra note 9, at Al (recognizing that growing number of consumers will encounter slamming
in the coming years).
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vided.55 The major goals of the 1996 Act are to create a giant market
for combined telecommunications services and eliminate much of
the "segmentation" that currently exists.6 Under various provisions
of the 1996 Act, customers can receive local telephone service
through a long-distance provider, or even through their local cable
television company.17 In fact, with interconnection between the local
loops that now terminate phone calls at consumers' premises and the
networks of cable and other utility companies, consumers can poten-
tially receive all of their communications services, including tele-
phone, Internet, and cable service, through one provider in a process
known as "bundling" of services.-
Unfortunately, while the 1996 Act is long on details of how the
"information superhighway" will operate in the next century, it is very
short on provisions that will protect consumers from abuses by the
new telecommunications giants that will likely dominate the indus-
try.9 As Bradley Stillman of the Consumer Federation of America
elaborates, "For every step taken to encourage competition, the bill
has provisions which undermine its goals."'o
B. Section 258 of the 1996 Act
1. Congressional intent
One of the very few consumer protections within the 1996 Act is
Section 258,61 which represents Congress' first effort to attack slam-
55. SeeCarney, supra note 1, at 289 (noting that the last major revision of U.S. communica-
tions laws was the Communications Act of 1934).
56. See id. (describing purpose of bill as creating "one giant marketplace for telecommu-
nication services").
57. See id. (forecasting the future changes in local phone service for consumers nation-
wide).
58. SeeMike Mills, On the Web, Finding a Carrier to Fit Your Calling PatternsXWASH. POST, Oct.
29, 1996, at CI (noting that bundling of services will allow customers to pay for all services on
one bill). Industry giant AT&T already offers long distance service, cellular service, Internet
access, satellite TV, and will soon offer local telephone service in many markets. See Catherine
Arnst, The Coming Telescramble; Bus. WIL, Apr. 8, 1996, at 64. MCI provides long distance serv-
ice, cellular service, and will soon offer satellite TV and the Internet. Other telecommunica-
tions companies have decided to merge in order to provide "bundled" services; in February
1996, for example, US West Communications announced that it was buying Continental Ca-
blevision. See id. This arrangement will allow the combined company to provide cable TV as
well as local and long distance phone service in one package. See id. (describing sweeping
changes that the 1996 Act will entail in eliminating the barriers between communication serv-
ices).
59. SeeCamrney, supra note 1, at 290 (recognizing that consumer groups are concerned that
major telephone companies may continue to control the industry).
60. Id.
61. See 47 U.S.CA. § 258 (West Supp. 1997) (prohibiting changes in telephone services
provider without proper verification; setting forth liability for violations).
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ming. 2 The Senate Commerce Committee draft of the 1996 Act did
not contain Section 258, or even address the issue.r Instead, Section
258 was part of a series of amendments contained in a House of Rep-
resentatives bill" that called for stronger deregulatory measures than
those provided in the Senate version of the 1996 Act.6 Although the
Conference Committee stripped most of the House amendments
from its final Report, the Conferees decided to adopt section 258 in
its entirety.66
The Conference Committee's Explanatory Statement indicates that
the House primarily intended the Amendment to apply the same
FCC rules applicable to slamming long-distance carriers to local
67phone companies. The final Conference Agreement reveals, how-
ever, that the Conferees intended Section 258 to have a much
broader scope.6a In addition to ensuring that the FCC's regulations
also covered local exchange companies, the Conference Agreement
62. Prior to the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the FCC regulated the
problems of slamming through the broad general authority granted the agency by the Com-
munications Act of 1934, as amended, see id. §§ 151-613, as well as the authority "reasonably
ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities." United
States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968);se also Computer and Communica-
tions Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that FCC has ancillary
jurisdiction over certain non-common carrier activities of common carriers). But see FCC v.
Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 706 (1979) (holding that FCC's ancillary jurisdiction over
cable television is not unlimited).
63. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 136 (1996),epinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 148
(statement ofJoint Managers).
64. H.R. 1555, 104th Cong. (1995). The House Report to H.R. 1555 states that"Section
251 requires the Commission to adopt rules to prevent illegal changes in subscriber carrier
selections, a practice known as 'slamming.'... The Committee intends that the Commission
should adopt rules to thwart the development of similar illegal practices as local exchanges be-
come open to competition." H.R. REP. No. 104-204, pt. 1, at 84 (1995), reinted in 1996
U.S.C.CAN. 10, 50.
65. SeeCarney, supra note 1, at 289 (noting that the 1996 Act deregulates much of the tele-
communications industry).
66. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 136 (1996),reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 124, 148
(statement ofJoint Managers).
67. See i. The Explanatory Statement of the House Amendment states that:
Section 251 requires the Commission to adopt rules to prevent illegal changes in sub-
scriber selections, a practice known as "slamming." The Commission has adopted
rules to address problems in the long distance industry of unauthorized changes of a
consumer's long-distance carrier. The House provision is designed to extend the pro-
visions of the current rule to local exchange carriers as well.
Id.
68. See id. The final Conference Agreement states:
The conferees adopt the House provision as a new section 258 of the Communica-
tions [sic] Act. It is the understanding of the conferees that in addition to requiring
that the carrier violating the Commission's procedures must reimburse the original
carrier for foregone revenues, the Commission's rules should also provide that con-
sumers are made whole. Specifically, the Commission's rules should require that car-
riers guilty of "slamming" should be held liable for premiums, including travel bo-
nuses, that would otherwise have been earned by telephone subscribers but were not
earned due to the violation of the Commission's rules under this section.
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stated that the goal of the FCC's regulations was to make slammed
consumers "whole," with remedies to include all premiums that the
consumer would have received with their specific calling plan,69 in-
cluding frequent flier miles" and free Internet service.7'
2. Statutory language in Section 258
The original text of the House Amendment went unchanged by
the Conference Committee,n and became law.7" Consequently, any
interpretation of Section 258 is extremely problematic because the
section's language appears only to grant the FCC authority to regu-
late incidents of slamming by long-distance carriers or local ex-
change carriers and to promulgate rules requiring "slamming" tele-
communications providers to reimburse telecommunications provid-
ers that lose business as a result of the unauthorized conversion.7
69. See id.
70. For example, MCI has a program with Delta and American Airlines where consumers
earn five frequent flier miles on either airline for each dollar they spend using MCI long dis-
tance, cellular, or calling card long distance service. Under this plan, for example, a consumer
or small business owner who usually spends $500 a month in combined telecommunications
services on MCI and was slammed by another provider for three months (an average time pe-
riod for receipt of a phone bill and arrangement to have service restored to the original pro-
vider), would lose 7500 frequent flier miles. See Advertisement from American Airlines sent to
the Author (July 8, 1996) (on file with author); see also USA TODAY, Oct. 29, 1996, at 5A
(offering five frequent flier miles on Delta Airlines for every dollar spent on MCI services).
The advertisement also offers a one-time "bonus" of 2000 frequent flier miles for switching
telecommunications service to MCI. See id.
71. Customers who use AT&T's long distance service also receive 5 free hours of Internet
service for each month they continue to use AT&T's services. If a customer is slammed and
continues to use AT&T's Internet services, they would have to pay the regular fee for unlimited
access of $19.95 per month. See AT&T Advertisement (Nov. 1, 1996) <http://www.att.com/
college>.
72. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 136 (1996),reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 124, 148
(statement ofJoint Managers).
73. Section 258 reads:
(a) PROHIBITION.- No telecommunications carrier shall submit or execute a change
in a subscriber's selection of a provider of telephone exchange service or telephone
toll service except in accordance with such verification procedures as the Commission
shall prescribe. Nothing in this section shall preclude any State commission from en-
forcing such procedures with respect to intrastate services.
(b) LIABILITY FOR CHARGES.- Any telecommunications carrier that violates the
verification procedures described in subsection (a) and that collects charges for tele-
phone exchange service or telephone toll service from a subscriber shall be liable to
the carrier previously elected by the subscriber in an amount equal to all charges paid
by such subscriber after such a violation, in accordance with such procedures as the
Commission may prescribe. The remedies provided by this subsection are in addition
to any other remedies available by law.
47 U.S.C. § 258 (West Supp. 1997).
74. Seeid.§258(b).
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IV. THE 1996 ACT AND FCC IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS FAIL TO
ADEQUATELY PROTECT CONSUMERS
A. The FCC's Section 258 Further Notice and Reconsideration Order
The FCC's 1997 Section 258 Further Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing and Reconsideration Order75 ("Section 258 Further Notice and
Order") further illustrates the FCC's inability to move from the failed
slamming rules only covering long-distance telephone service to a
new regulatory framework that will protect all consumers in the
completely deregulated telecommunications market. The major rule
change proposed in the Section 258 Further Notice and Order is the
expansion of the definition of carriers affected from just Iong-
distance telephone carriers to any "telecommunications carrier."76
Unfortunately, the Section 258 Further Notice and Order also re-
jected various petitions to reconsider current FCC rules allowing
telecommunications carriers to design their own LOAs and attach
LOAS to promotional materials,77 and continues to permit the use of
inducement checks as LOAs. 78 Therefore, while the 1996 Act and the
Section 258 Further Notice and Order expands the definition of enti-
ties covered by the slamming regulations, from long-distance carriers
to all telecommunications carriers, the proposed FCC rules essen-
tially retain the current FCC regulations that have failed to deter
slamming in the long-distance market. Thus, section 258 and the
Section 258 Further Notice and Order may actually cause more harm
than good by expanding the FCC's lax verification standards to the
entire market. Under the current regulatory regime, section 258
gives the appearance of being a tough response against slamming,
when in effect it is nothing more than a paper tiger.
B. Section 258 and FCC Implementing Regulations Cannot Make Slammed
Consumers "Whole"
1. Lost premiums
Section 258 likely does not provide authority for the FCC to insure
75. Implementation of the Subscriber Carrier Selection Changes Provisions of the Tele-
communications Act of 1996 and Policies and Rules Concerning Unauthorized Changes of
Consumer's Long Distance Carriers, 12 F.C.C. Rcd. 10,674 (1997) (Further Notice of Proposed
Ruemaking and Memorandum Order on Recon.) [hereinafter Section 258 Further Notice and
Order].
76. Id. at 10,682-83.
77. See id. at 10,703-04 (stating that current requirements allowing an LOA to be attached
to promotional materials as long as it is ultimately separable and "reasonably balances the in-
formational interests of consumers and the marketing flexibility of the industry").
78. See id. at 10,703 (allowing the continued use of checks as LOAs).
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that consumers are made whole with regard to lost premiums be-
cause the Act provides no enforcement mechanism or clues as to im-
plementation, even though the Conference Committee Report ex-
pressly states that consumers are to be compensated for their losses.7
In the Section 258 Further Notice and Order, the FCC tentatively
concluded that disputes between authorized and unauthorized carri-
ers over the value of premiums that were to be provided by the
authorized telecommunications carrier must be resolved through
"private settlement negotiations regarding the transfer of charges
and the value of lost premiums ... prior to petitioning the Commis-
sion to make a determination."' ° In essence, this represents a codifi-
cation of the status quo, as it provides aggrieved consumers with no
further protections than existed before the passage of the 1996 Act
and section 258.8' Under the FCC's interpretation of section 258(b),
consumers still will not have an independent enforcement entity to
approach for resolution of slamming complaints that involve a loss of
premiums.
In the case of lost premiums, however, much of the enforcement
problem essentially can be traced to poor legislative drafting of sec-
tion 258, and the fact that it provides no specific jurisdiction to the
FCC to regulate what essentially are general consumer protection is-
sues. Additionally, under the current section 258 framework and the
FCC's general mandate to regulate telecommunications, the FCC
likely does not have ancillary jurisdiction to directly regulate the pro-
visions of premiums, such as frequent flier miles, because such pre-
miums are not closely connected to the regulation of telecommuni-
cations."
79. See47 U.S.CA. § 258 (West Supp. 1997). Section 258 provides no mechanism for con-
sumer remedies that would address lost premiums or charges for telecommunications services
that are higher than the customer's previous provider. Additionally, it is highly doubtful that
any remedies could be provided by the FCC, since the issue of lost premiums associated with
the "bundling" of services is probably not "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of
the Commission's various responsibilities." United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S.
157, 178 (1968). Activities involving lost premiums would most likely fall under the jurisdiction
of the Federal Trade Commission. See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
80. Section 258 Further Notice and Order, supra note 75, at 10692.
81. In the Section 258 Further Notice and the Order, the FCC opines that "the properly
authorized carrier is in the best position to take prompt and effective action to make sure that a
consumer is "made whole" because that carrier and the consumer will have a continuing car-
rier-customer relationship." Id. This entire argument, however, ignores the fact that the sys-
tem the FCC endorses is essentially the current system where an authorized carrier must try to
force a slamming carrier to turn over ill-gotten revenue. Because private carriers lack any en-
forcement powers, slamming carriers are generally able to ignore their requests for reim-
bursement with relative impunity.
82. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. The FCC's ancillary jurisdiction extends
only to actions "necessary to ensure the achievement of the Commission's statutory responsi-
bilities." FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 706 (1979).
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One possible explanation for the lack of detail and delegation of
authority in Section 258 is that Congress lacked information about
the level of consumer abuse present in the deregulated long distance
market.83 Unfortunately, previous legislation regulating "pay-per-call"
services,84 primarily "900" number providers offering information
services for a fee,a presents ample evidence that such an explanation
is false. Following years of abusive practices by many pay-per-call
services and inaction by the FCC, Congress enacted the Telephone
Disclosure and Dispute Resolution Act ("TDDRA') in 1992.8
TDDRA establishes a unique framework for prevention of abuses in
pay-per-call services by setting up "a system of national regulation and
review that will oversee interstate pay-per-call services" managed by
the FCC,88 and a mechanism for dispute resolution overseen by the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC").'
Under Title I of TDDRA, the FCC has exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate the technical aspects of pay-per-call services, including the
method of billing utilized by these services and procedures that con-
sumers can use to block access to these services from their home
phone numbers.' Title II of TDDRA deals exclusively with the en-
forcement of regulations designed to prohibit deceptive advertising
in connection with pay-per-call services.91 Title II reserves all en-
forcement power over deceptive advertising to the FTC, which can
take action under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.9
Title III of TDDRA establishes a detailed system for the resolution of
83. Although Congress may have lacked information on the scope of the problem, it is
likely that recent FCC actions should have at least indicated that the FCC was having trouble
controlling the slamming problem. See generally 1995 LOA Order, supra note 6, at 9563
(admitting that the FCC continues to receive a large number of slamming complaints from
consumers despite its efforts to foster industry self-regulation).
84. See Telephone Disclosure and Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 102-556, 106 Stat.
4181-95 (1992) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 5701,5711-5714,5721-5724 (1994)) (amended 1996).
85. Pay-per-call services are generally provided via "900" numbers that are billed directly to
a consumer's local telephone bill. In some cases, however, the services are provided through a
toll-free number ("800" or "888") if the consumer has a presubscription agreement with the
information provider that manages the pay-per-call service. See id. § 1, 106 Stat. at 4181.
86. See id.
87. See id. The congressional findings cited in TDDRA are remarkably similar to many of
the problems that plague consumers today with incidents of slamming. Congress found that
"[t]he lack of nationally uniform regulatory guidelines has led to confusion for callers, sub-
scribers, industry participants, and regulatory agencies as to the rights of callers and the over-
sight responsibilities of regulatory authorities." Id. The findings conclude that "[t]he contin-
ued growth of the legitimate pay-per-call industry is dependent upon consumer confidence
that unfair and deceptive behavior will be effectively curtailed and that consumers will have
adequate rights of redress." Id.
88. See id. § 228(a) (1), 106 Stat. at 4182.
89. See id. § 228(a) (2), 106 Stat. at 4182.
90. See id. § 228, 106 Stat. at 4182-86.
91. See id. § 201, 106 Stat. at 4187-89.
92. Seeid. § 201(c), 106 Stat. at 4189.
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billing and collection disputes between consumers and pay-per-call
providers.3
Much of the TDDRA model could have been adopted by Congress
in the 1996 Act to regulate incidents of slamming, provide a method
for dispute resolution, and to allow for the recovery of premiums lost
as a result of slamming violations. The reason why Congress did not
adopt the TDDRA model is unclear. Much of the rationale, however,
probably revolves around the fact that most pay-per-call providers are
small companies with little, if any, political clout, whereas long dis-
tance companies are generally able to fend off efforts to impose
greater consumer protections at both the legislative and regulatory
level.94
2. Lost access to the former long-distance companies' rates
Under the express language of section 258(b), the slammed con-
sumer is liable for the full amount of any services provided to the
telecommunications provider that converted the consumer's service
without authorization.95 Section 258 actually could cause greater
harm to consumers. In the new market a much wider array of serv-
ices will be available through telecommunications providers, expos-
ing consumers to higher levels of liability under section 258(b).9
"The sad thing is, it actually pays to slam people .... The FCC has
given the green light," states Val Heffner of the Discount Long Dis-
tance Digest.97 Under a literal reading of section 258(b), a customer
93. See id. § 301, 106 Stat. at 4191-92.
94. Although most of the major long distance companies affected by the FCC's slamming
regulations are multimillion dollar companies (or in the case of AT&T, Sprint, and MCI, mul-
tibillion dollar companies), most pay-per-call services are "Mom and Pop" type operations with
limited revenues. Even some of the smaller companies, however, have hired lobbyists in an
effort to ease rules against slamming at both the legislative and regulatory levels. Cherry
Communications, for instance, is a long-distance carrier with only 500,000 customers, but is
growing rapidly due to its aggressive marketing techniques. Seeking to settle complaints filed
with the California Public Utilities Commission against Cherry Communications, ownerJames
Elliot (a former real estate agent and convicted felon) hired former Senator Paul Laxalt to
meet with the commission's chief investigator. See Michael G. Wagner, PUC Slams Door on Car-
rierfor Iega Switching, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1996, at Al [hereinafter Wagner, PUC Slams Door].
95. Section 258 states that a telecommunications carrier that "collects charges" for service
.shall be liable to the carrier previously selected by the subscriber in an amount equal to all
charges paid by such subscriber after such violation." 47 U.S.C.A. § 258(b) (West Supp. 1997)
(emphasis added). The logic of this section punishes consumers by requiring them to pay the
fees charged by the slamming telecommunications provider, while the consumer's old provider
receives a windfall.
96. Under the provisions of the 1996 Act, it is likely that consumers will have their tele-
communications services "bundled" and will receive their long distance and local phone serv-
ice from the same telecommunications company. If a customer who has bundled services is
slammed, it is likely that the slamming company will convert all of the subscriber's services,
which could lead to larger potential liabilities for consumers. See Catherine Arnst, The Not-So-
Calm Before the Storm, BUS. WK.,Jan. 8,1996, at 96.
97. Wagner, Long-Distance Phone Customers, supra note 9, at Al.
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who is slammed remains liable to the slamming telecommunications
provider, which then must turn the proceeds over to the "slammed"
telecommunications provider.98 This perverse logic subjects the cus-
tomer, who is the real victim, to liability for charges that almost al-
ways are higher than those charged by the previous long-distance car-
rier. Meanwhile, the previous long-distance carrier gets a windfall
above what it would have received if the customer had not been
slammed." The slamming long-distance carrier theoretically loses
the cost of services provided to the slammed consumer. Unfortu-
nately, because many incidents of slamming are not detected, it often
makes economic sense for long-distance carriers to play the odds and
slam as many consumers as possible.'1
The Section 258 Further Notice and Order does take some positive
steps in the area of consumer liability by discussing possible new
regulations that would absolve consumers of liability for charges
when a telecommunication service is converted without consent.
10'
The FCC does not, however, provide any concrete proposals in this
area, mainly due to apparent confusion over the congressional intent
behind section 258.102 Therefore, until the ongoing regulatory rou-
lette over consumer liability for unauthorized charges is resolved, it is
likely that the slammers will continue to prey on telecommunications
consumers.
98. See 47 U.S.C.A- § 258(b) (West Supp. 1997).
99. Current FCC regulations allow slamming long-distance carriers to collect the amount
that the customer would have paid to their old long distance provider had the unauthorized
conversion not occurred. See 1995 LOA Order, supra note 6, at 9572. Section 258(b) is drafted
in a manner, however, that seems to allow slamming long-distance carriers or other telecom-
munications providers to collect the full amount of their services, which would then be turned
over to the customer's old telecommunications provider if the customer can prove they were
slammed. See47 U.S.CA § 258(b).
100. For every dollar of revenue, most small long distance providers make from 25 to 40
cents in profit. Thus, even if one out of every five slammed customers complains and proves
they are a victim of slamming (a very liberal assumption), the average long distance company
can still make a profit. SeeWagner, Long-Distance Phone Customers, supra note 9, at Al.
101. See Section 258 Further Notice and Order, supra note 75, at 10,689-90 (requesting
comments on the issue of "whether slammed consumers should have the option of refusing to
pay charges assessed by an unauthorized carrier").
102. The text of the Section 258 Further Notice and Order states that "[u]nder section
258(b), the liability between properly authorized and unauthorized carriers exist only to the
extent that the unauthorized carrier actually collects charges from a slammed consumer," thus
tending to support the proposition that the FCC could easily promulgate rules absolving
slammed consumers of liability for unauthorized charges. See id at 10,690. In the footnotes
accompanying the text of the order, however, the FCC appears to recognize that such a change
may not comport with congressional intent behind the section in noting that"[tthe legislative
history of Section 258 supports the view that carriers violating our verification procedures 'must
reimburse the [properly authorized] carrier for forgone revenues.'" Id. at 10,690 n.83.
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3. Slamming in the local service market
One of the major goals of the 1996 Act is to open up local tele-
phone service, now a near-monopoly controlled by the former Bell
Operating Companies, to the same competition that transformed the
long distance market 05 Under section 258(a) of the 1996 Act, Con-
gress defined slamming as an unauthorized change in "telephone ex-
change service or telephone toll service" by a "telecommunications
carrier."' O° This definition significantly expands the FCC's old defini-
tion by including local telephone service providers as parties that are
potentially liable for incidents of slamming.'0 5
This expansion of liability for incidents of slamming would appear
to provide consumers with additional protection. Because Section
258 and the FCC's implementing regulations essentially retain cur-
rent FCC verification policies, however, the situation could become
much worse. In the current telecommunications market, slammed
consumers can turn to their local telephone service providers for as-
sistance and verification that a slamming long-distance carrier sub-
mitted a faulty primary interexchange carrier change request' °6
Many local telephone service providers also waive the charge to
change a primary interexchange carrier back to the original carrier
and allow customers to sign contracts forbidding any primary inter-
exchange carrier changes without a customer's specific authoriza-
tion. 
07
103. See Carney, supra note 1, at 289. The 1996 Act preempts all state and local laws that bar
telecommunications companies from offering local service. To spur competition in local mar-
kets, the 1996 Act also requires that all incumbent local service providers allow interconnection
to their networks at the same level and quality of service that they provide themselves. To en-
courage the regional Bell companies to enter into interconnection agreements, the 1996 Act
provides that the companies will be allowed to offer long distance services as soon as they allow
competition in their local service area. See i. at 290.
104. 47U.S.CA § 258(a).
105. Prior to the passage of the 1996 Act, consumers could only receive local telephone
service from their incumbent local telephone company. The 1996 Act, however, preempts all
state and local laws prohibiting competition in the local phone market, thus making consumers
in all states susceptible to incidents of slamming in both the local and long distance telephone
markets. See Carney, supra note 1, at 290.
106. SeeJon Van, State Bans Long-Distance Phone Firn, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 6, 1995, at 5. Many
local phone companies now provide assistance to consumers who are victims of slamming.
Ameritech, the BOG that serves Illinois and much of the rest of the Midwest, provides a toll-free
number for consumers to call if they are slammed or if they wish to place a block on their long
distance service so that it will not be changed without their written approval. See id.
107. See Denise Gellene, Long-Distance 'Slams' on the Rise, LA TIMES, Jan. 7, 1994, at D3.
Usually, local telephone companies will switch consumers who allege they have been slammed
back to their original provider, free of charge. See id. The local phone company can then con-
tact the long-distance carrier that submitted the change order and ask it for an LOA verifying
that the customer requested the change. If the long-distance carrier cannot produce an LOA
or evidence of third party verification, then they are required by the FCC to reimburse the lo-
cal phone company for the cost of the primary interexchange carrier change. See 1992 PIG
Verification Order, supra note 26, at 1050 (explaining that long-distance carriers remain re-
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When competitive services become widely available in the local
market, it is highly likely that many customers will have both their lo-
cal and long distance services converted by the same telecommunica-
tions provider.'08 In such cases, customers will have serious difficulty
resolving a slamming complaint since the slamming company will
likely have used a fraudulent LOA to self-execute a change of a con-
sumer's entire telephone service package.' Under the current sys-
tem, long-distance carriers must submit primary interexchange car-
rier change requests to local telephone service providers that will
execute the change, thus providing independent verification of the
change and a means of challenging the change through the local
110
company.
Alternatively, if the FCC or Congress does not move to implement
additional procedures to ensure that telecommunications providers
follow strict primary interexchange carrier verification guidelines, it
is likely that many telecommunications providers will move towards
adopting their own rules which will stifle competition through a
patchwork of competing verification procedures."' Ameritech, for
instance, has already sent out contracts to many of its subscribers in
the Chicago area asking them to "lock in" their local service to pre-
vent slamming of local service."2 While such "lock in" contracts will
undoubtedly prevent slamming, they also have the potential to create
sponsible to local phone companies for disputed charges for which they cannot produce an
LOA).
108. SeeArnst & Mandel, supra note 59, at 64. AT&T, for instance, has plans to control one-
third of the local phone market within the next three to four years by using its name to lure
customers into package deals where they will receive all of their telecommunications services
through one company. See Catherine Arnst, Ready, Set, Devour?, Bus. WK., July 8, 1996, at 118.
One big advantage for consumers, at least in the short run, are the pricing reductions for bun-
dled services. "When I look into the future, I see local phone service in some cases given away
for free," commented John Hoffman, policy chief of Sprint Corporation. See Arnst, Hold the
Phone, supra note 11, at 32.
109. See Telephone Service: Don't Fall Prey to the Slam Scam, CONSUMER REP., Oct. 1996, at 62
[hereinafter Telephone Service] (explaining that, as competition increases in the local telephone
service market, consumers will have greater slamming problems with unauthorized conversions
of all telecommunications services, not merely telephone long-distance).
110. See 1992 PIC Verification Order, supra note 26, at 1038. The fact that long-distance
carriers do not have to submit a signed LOA has engendered a great deal of criticism from
many commentators. They contend that these procedures make it far too easy for long-
distance carriers to illegally convert a consumer's long distance phone service. Additionally,
the fact that local phone companies are allowed to charge the customer a fee for the primary
interexchange carrier change, usually around five dollars, does not help matters because many
local phone companies are more than happy to accept this money, with no questions asked. See
Wagner, Long-Distance Phone Customers, supra note 9, at Al.
111. See Telephone Service, supra note 109, at 62 (warning that "as competition increases for
local telephone service, any number of companies may start handling switching, billing, and
freeze requests").
112. See Thousands File Forms, supra note 30, at 3 (discussing the fact that the slamming prob-
lem is so severe in the Chicago area that Ameritech has sent out forms in customer's monthly
phone bills asking them to lock in their preferred long-distance carrier).
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an anticompetitive environment by locking customers into their cur-
rent carriers. 3
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Tighter Verification Requirements
The FCC's 1992 PIC Verification Order adopted four verification
procedures, discussed in Part II,1' requiring long-distance carriers to
use one to verify changes in primary interexchange carriers."5  Of
these four options, the most confusing verification procedures are
those that require consumers to return a postcard to avoid conver-
sion, or provide for electronic authorization of primary interex-
change carrier changes. Therefore, Congress should amend Section
258(a)1 6 by deleting the first sentence, which specifies that no tele-
communication provider shall change a subscriber's services "except
in accordance with such verification procedures as the Commission
shall prescribe."' 7 In its place, Congress should add language stating
that "no telecommunications carrier shall submit or execute a
change in a subscriber's selection of a provider of telephone ex-
change service or telephone toll service except in accordance with
subsection (c)." The new subsection (c) should prescribe two ac-
ceptable forms of verification: (1) submission of a written LOA from
the subscriber giving their consent to conversion of services;" or
(2) unambiguous oral verification of a change in telecommunication
services, which is verified and recorded by a third party with no fi-
nancial connection to the telecommunications provider. If oral re-
corded verification is used, the independent third-party verification
113. See id.
114. Seesupranotes 36-42 and accompanying text.
115. The FCC has tentatively concluded that the "Welcome package" option should be
eliminated, leaving three permissible verification procedures. See Section 258 Further Notice
and Order, supra note 75, at 10,685-86(concluding that the "welcome package" option func-
tions as a negative LOA). As this Comment went to press, the section 258 Final Report and Or-
der had not yet been released.
116. 47 U.S.CA § 258(a) (West Supp. 1997).
117. Id.
118. In obtaining signed LOAs, telecommunications providers or marketers should attempt
to verify that the information on the LOA is accurate. See In reAT&T Corp., 1996 WL 709120,
at *7 (F.C.C. Dec. 11, 1996) (order). In this consent decree, AT&T agreed that all customer
names and signatures would be verified at the point of sale through customer provider identifi-
cation. In cases where the LOA is sent to AT&T or where the customer is unable to provide
identification at the point of sale, AT&T agreed that it will re-contact these customers by tele-
phone prior to executing a primary interexchange carrier change to ensure that the LOA is
genuine. See id. Although this Comment does not endorse any one form of LOA verification,
it is very likely that most providers will adopt stricter verification procedures to escape the
heightened liability provided for in these recommendations.
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agency should also be required to pay employees on an hourly basis,
not based on how many customers they convert."' In both cases,
telecommunications providers should be requested to keep records,
for a period of six months, of their customers' oral or written consent




In the 1995 LOA Order, the FCC stated that, "Our experience in-
dicates that for fair competition to continue, consumers must have
clear and unambiguous information about the actions and the choice
they are being asked to make."' 2' Having made that statement, the
FCC then decided to continue to "allow IXCs the flexibility to design
the LOA in a manner that is complimentary to their associated pro-
motional material. ' 2 The Section 258 Further Notice and Order un-
fortunately allows the practice of individual LOA design to con-
tinue.1 23 This is an inappropriate response to the problem of
confusing and misleading LOAs. Instead of focusing on the fact that
an LOA should serve as a form showing that the consumer gave his
or her informed consent to a change in the long distance service, the
FCC sadly treats the LOA as merely an extension of a long-distance
carrier's marketing techniques.
2 4
119. See id. In this order, AT&T entered into a consent decree with the FCC in which
AT&T agreed to contact 500 customers each month using "contracted temporary personnel"
who "will be paid on an hourly basis instead of a volume-driven compensation plan." Id.
120. Almost all long-distance carriers currently keep LOAs and other records on hand for
at least this period of time due to current FCC requirements. See supra notes 19-21 and accom-
panying text (explaining that long-distance carriers should have LOAs on hand to protect
themselves from customer misunderstandings and liability for unauthorized charges); see also
AT&T Corp., 1996 WL 709120, at *8 (announcing that AT&T had reached a consent decree
with the FCC in which AT&T agreed to keep LOAs and other records on hand for a period of
two years and make such records available to the FCC within 14 days of the commission's writ-
ten request).
121. 1995 LOA Order, supra note 6, at 9567.
122. See id. at 9564.
123. See Section 258 Further Notice and Order, supra note 75, at 10,704 (denying NAAGs
petition to mandate separate LOAs and continuing LOAs that are attached to promotional ma-
terials as long as the LOA is "separable").
124. In the 1995 LOA Order, the FCC rejected a standardized LOA form because the
agency believed that a standardized LOA would restrict long-distance carriers' marketing tech-
niques and raise serious First Amendment concerns. See 1995 LOA Order, supra note 6, at
9566-67 (describing arguments put forward by both supporters and opponents of standardized
LOAs). This analysis completely ignores the FCC's own experience in implementing the Allo-
cation Order, which required long distance providers to use a standardized LOA. See Alloca-
tion Order, supra note 15, at 912. In the Allocation Order, the FCC required all local tele-
phone companies that were subject to the MFJ to provide customers with ballots to choose
their presubscribed long-distance carrier. See id. at 921, 925. The ballots provided by local
telephone companies had to conform to a standardform set forth by the FCC, and could be ac-
companied by marketing materials only on a limited basis. See id. app. B at 927 (allowing for
distribution of marketing information if approved by LEC). Specifically, the ballots had to con-
tain: (1) a standardized caption; (2) the name of the local phone company and the customer's
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To rectify this problem, Congress should amend Section 258 to
add a new subsection (d). The amendment would establish a stan-
dard format for the LOA that all telecommunications providers
choosing to use them as a verification procedure would have to use.
The standard LOA form should contain: (1) a listing of the sub-
scriber's billing name, address, and phone number to be con-
verted;ss (2) an affirmation of the subscriber's decision to convert
telecommunications service from the current provider to the pro-
spective provider;'2 (3) a statement that the subscriber understands
that there may be only one preferred interexchange service pro-
vider;27 and (4) a list of all telecommunications services covered by
the LOA (i.e., local service, long distance service, cellular service,
etc.).12 The heading of the LOA should state in conspicuous letters,
"Application to Change Telecommunications Provider."' Also, if
any part of the LOA appears in a language other than English, then
the entire LOA form must also be translated into that language.'3
C. Enhanced Penalties for Slamming Violations
One of the easiest ways to eliminate slamming is to eliminate the
profit potential that drives the practice. 3' Under current FCC prac-
name, address, and telephone number, (3) instructions on how to fill out the ballot; (4) a list
of long-distance carriers from which the customer could choose; (5) the date on which the
service conversion would take place; (6) a due date for the ballot; and (7) a signature and date
line for the customer to verify their consent to the new selection. See id. Because a standard-
ized presubscription ballot was permissible under the Allocation Plan, why is a standardized
LOA not permissible under present circumstances?




129. In 1995, Consumer Action, New York Public Service, and the American Carrier Tele-
phone Association submitted comments requesting the FCC to adopt a standard title for all
LOA forms such as, "An Order to Change My Long Distance Telephone Service Provider,"
"Application to Change My Long Distance Company," or "Order Form to Change My Long
Distance Telephone Service." See 1995 LOA Order, supra note 6, at 9581. The FCC's response
was that "[a]lthough we will not prescribe a particular title for the LOA, we agree with these
commenters (sic] and strongly suggest that all IXCs use a clear, easily understood title." Id.
130. This represents a codification of current FCC regulations. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1150(g)
(1996).
131. See CHARLEs H. KENNEDY, AN INTRODUCTION TO U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 122
(1994) (describing economic forces that motivate suppliers to pursue only profitable strate-
gies). In a purely competitive telecommunications market, all buyers should be fully informed
about the prices and quality of telecommunications services available from all suppliers. See id.
app. at 122, 126 & n.9. Then, after considering all of the available suppliers, a consumer will be
able to make a fully informed choice regarding the most efficient provider.
"The key is that in pure competition the market-not the supplier-sets the price for
the product...." Id. at 122. Telecommunications "providers" who engage in slamming re-
verse the pure competition model by giving the consumer no information and no choice. In
effect, slammers are able to make millions of dollars in profit by using supplier set prices which
far exceed the price they pay for service and the small fines that are occasionally levied by the
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tice, long-distance carriers that repeatedly commit slamming viola-
tions are issued "Notices of Apparent Liability""' in which they are
asked to explain their actions in a manner satisfactory to the FCC.'"
If the long-distance carrier is unable to do so, the FCC issues a
"Notice of Forfeiture" against the long-distance carrier, which oper-
ates as a fine and is designed to serve as a deterrent.'m Unfortunately,
FCC. See The Switch is on at Phone Companies, supra note 8, at 6 (describing efforts of state attor-
neys general and federal regulators' efforts to recover millions of dollars each year). There-
fore, the only way to insure that anti-competitive forces are driven out of the telecommunica-
tions market is to take away ill-gotten profits. See KENNEDY, supra, at 119-22 (providing overview
of economic principles governing newly deregulated telecommunications market).
132. Under the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, the FCC has the authority to
levy a forfeiture of up to one hundred thousand dollars for each violation or each day of a con-
tinuing violation to a maximum of one million dollars for any one act. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 503(b)(2)(B) (1994). In assessing such a penalty, the FCC must take into account the
.nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation and, with respect to the violator, the
degree of culpability, any history of prior offenses, ability to pay, and such other matters asjus-
tice may require." Id. § 503(b) (2) (D). After a Notice of Apparent Liability is released, the al-
leged violator can present evidence, with regard to the above categories, to show that it should
not be liable for the forfeiture or that it should pay a lesser amount. Generally, the FCC looks
to a telecommunications provider's gross revenues to set the amount of apparent liability. See
generally Matrix Telecom, Inc., 11 F.C.C.R. 1258, 1259-60 (1995) (utilizing defendants' financial
information as basis for setting forfeiture amount).
133. See generally Matrix Telecom, Inc., supra note 133, at 1258 (finding that provider failed
to adequately explain its actions). See Excel Telecommunications, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 10,880,
10,880 (1995) (finding Excel liable for $80,000 forfeiture because it had"willfully or repeatedly
violated Commission rules and orders by changing the primary interexchange carrier desig-
nated by [a consumer]"); Interstate Say., Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 10,877, 10,878 (1995) (finding ICI
liable for $40,000 forfeiture due to "willful" violations in slamming case).
134. Fines assessed against slamming long-distance carriers have questionable impact. In
May 1994, the FCC entered into a consent decree with Cherry Communications "after receiving
a large volume of consumer complaints alleging that Cherry may have engaged in widespread
violation of Commission rules and orders pertaining to primary interexchange carrier (PIG)
changes." Cherry Consent Decree, supra note 6, at 2086. As part of the consent decree, Cherry
agreed to implement "remedial measures," including verification of every LOA by non-sales
personnel, and payment of $500,000 in monthly installments to the U.S. Treasury over a period
of 36 months. See id. at 2087. Evidently, the consent decree had little effect on Cherry's mar-
keting practices because in 1996, state regulators in California banned Cherry from conducting
any business in the state for a period of two years. SeeWagner, PUG Slams Door, supra note 94, at
Al. In one particularly egregious incident, Cherry slammed 19 telephone lines of a California
business after the owner requested the conversion of only five lines to test Cherry's prices.
When the business owner asked to have his phone lines connected back to the original long-
distance carrier, Cherry refused and slammed his phones six more times over the next seven
weeks. See id. Later, Cherry sent the owner a bill for the slammed services, and when he re-
fused to pay, Cherry sued. Cherry finally relented after the business owner hired a lawyer who
initiated a formal proceeding before California regulators that lead to Cherry's banishment
from the state. See id. Cherry has also been under investigation in at least 10 other states, in-
cluding Illinois, where the company agreed to pay a fine of $100,000 and reimburse slammed
consumers. See Rob Karwath, Cherry Communications Settles Long-Distance Case, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9,
1993, at 2; see also Common Carrier Bureau Adopts Consent Decree Agreement with MCI Resolving Notice
of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture for Slamming, Federal Document Clearing House,June 21, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. In this consent decree, MCI agreed to make a
"voluntary contribution" of $30,000 to the U.S. Treasury and stated its intention to add addi-
tional protections against slamming by using a third party to verify all of its home and small
business conversions. John B. Muleta, Chief of the FCC's Enforcement Division, Common Car-
rier Bureau, hailed the agreement as "a victory for consumers, for the FCC and for MCI," and
stated that it represents "a better way to protect customers from errors and to ensure that they
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most of the fines levied by the FCC fall far below the amount re-
quired to diminish the profit margins of slamming long-distance car-
riers.' m Thus, most long-distance carriers that engage in slamming
likely view the FCC fines as a cost of doing business.'3
The easiest way of diminishing this profit motive is to absolve
slammed customers of liability for charges incurred while they are us-
ing the slamming carrier's services. The FCC considered adopting
this approach in its 1995 LOA Order, but ultimately rejected it,5 7 de-
spite the urging of attorneys general from 25 states'ss The 1996 Act,
and its accompanying legislative history, further complicates matters
in this area by providing conflicting standards regarding slamming
carrier's liability to authorized carriers and consumers.'39
Therefore, because the FCC has thus far refused to adopt a regula-
tion absolving slammed consumers from charges incurred by the of-
fending company, and because of the ambiguity in current section
258, Congress should amend Section 258(b) "' to require the com-
mission to protect consumers in this manner by requiring telecom-
munication companies to absolve slammed consumers of charges for
illegally converted service for a three-month period after the illegal
change is executed. "' Not only would such action reduce the profit
are hooked up to the long-distance carrier of their choice." Id. Unfortunately for consumers,
this agreement applies only to MCI.
135. David Giangreco, President of Cherry Communications, estimates that the company
has monthly revenues in the area of $40 to $45 million dollars. See Wagner, PUC Slams Door,
supra note 95, at Al. Thus, the FCC's fine imposed upon Cherry in its 1994 consent decree
represents less than 2% of Cherry's monthly revenues.
136. See 1995 LOA Order, supra note 6, at 9579 (acknowledging that revenue is driving
force behind slamming).
137. See id. The FCC acknowledged that, "[S]ome IXCs engaging in slamming may not be
deterred unless all revenue gained through slamming is denied them." Later in the same
paragraph, the FCC seemed to admit that its own rules probably do not go far enough, stating,
.we may have to revisit this question at a later date." Id.
138. See Jube Shiver, Jr., Crackdown on Phone Service Switching Sought, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15,
1995, at Dl. The 25 states seeking more aggressive enforcement against slamming are: Ari-
zona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Mary-
land, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. In
theirjoint petition, the Attorneys General stated that"[t]o reward the wrongdoer by allowing it
to receive any benefit from its wrongful actions is contrary to long-established, equitable prin-
ciples and would encourage rather than deter further slamming." Id.
139. See supra notes 61-71, 95-102 and accompanying text (discussing section 258 and its
emphasis that authorized carriers must be compensated for forgone revenue due to slamming,
whereas the legislative history emphasizes the conference committee's belief that the consumer
not be liable for charges associated with unauthorized conversions of telecommunications serv-
ices).
140. 47 U.S.CA § 258(b) (West Supp. 1997).
141. See 1995 LOA Order, supra note 6, at 9579. In the 1995 LOA Order, the FCC stated,
"[D]espite the compelling arguments of those favoring total absolution of all toll charges from
unauthorized long-distance carriers, we are not convinced that we should, as a policy matter,
adopt that option at this time." Id. The FCC rests this rationale on the fact that, "The
'slammed' consumer does receive a service, even though the service is being provided by an
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motive available to slamming telecommunications providers, it would
also eliminate the potential windfall that Section 258(b) presently af-
fords to the previous telecommunications provider.
42
D. The FTC Should Have Jurisdiction Over Consumer Slamming
Complaints
Since the breakup of the AT&T monopoly in 1984, the FCC has es-
tablished a solid record of fostering competition in the U.S. long-
distance telephone market.'4 Unfortunately, the FCC has done little
to halt anticompetitive practices in the deregulated market during
this time. '" Much of the FCC's inability to stop fraudulent practices
is directly attributable to the fact that the FCC has a dual mission.,
On one hand, the FCC seeks to encourage newcomers to enter the
deregulated telecommunications market, which is an admirable
goal. 4 6 On the other hand, the FCC also is charged with taking ac-
unauthorized entity." Id. Additionally, the FCC states that the adoption of such a rule would
lead to consumers intentionally converting their service, and then claiming that they were
slammed in order to receive free long distance service. See id. This argument, however, carries
little weight. Fraudulent slamming claims made by consumers are easily dispelled by providers
who abide by the current FCC requirements that all LOAs be signed by the consumer request-
ing the change. Thus, the telecommunications provider will have evidence that a consumer
ordered its service and, therefore, is not entitled to the absolution of charges. See Telephone
Consumer Slamming Prevention Act of 1997, H.R. 2120, 105th Cong., § 2 (proposing that con-
sumers be absolved of up to six-months of charges following an unauthorized conversion of
telecommunications service); Slamming Prevention and Consumer Act of 1997, H.R. 3050,
105th Cong. (providing for the absolution of charges for up to three-months charges following
an unauthorized conversion of service). This Comment concludes that absolving consumers of
liability for up to a three-month period best protects the interest of the aggrieved consumers,
while decreasing the incentive to delay reporting an incident of slamming in order to receive
free telecommunications service.
142. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (noting that because many incidents of
slamming go unreported, it may make economic sense for an IXC to slam as many customers as
possible).
143. See Horovitz, supra note 32, at DI (illustrating sharp decline in AT&T's share of long-
distance telephone market from 1984 to 1990); see also Communications Reg. No. 96-39, at 1
(P&F) (Sept. 30, 1996) (explaining that in second quarter of 1996, AT&T's share of long-
distance telephone market dropped to 54%).
144. See supra note 8 (recounting that, from November 1991 to June 1995, slamming com-
plaints received by FCC rose from less than 100 per month to more than 700 per month). In
1995, 34% of all complaints received by the FCC concerned slamming, by far the largest cate-
gory of complaints. See Common Carrier Scorecard Report Goes On-Line, Federal Document Clear-
ing House, Dec. 10, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
145. SeeDebra Kay Thomas Graves, Comment, The Consumer Protection Myth in Long-Distance
Telephone Regulation: Remedies for the "Caveat Dialer" Attitude, 27 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 383, 421
(1996) (stating that FCC has been "relentlessly pursuing a competitive market," while ignoring
consumer complaints); see also The Structure of the Savings and Loan Bailout: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. Supervision, Regulation and Ins., Resolution Trust Corp. Task Force of the
Comm. on Bankin& Finance and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong. 63 (1991) (statement of Marshall J.
Breger, Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States) (explaining problems with
use of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's bureaucracy to administer most day-to-day
functions of Resolution Trust Corporation in light of different missions of these agencies).
146. See Carney, supra note 1, at 289 (explaining that main goal of 1996 Act is to create
competitive environment for all forms of telecommunications fostered through deregulatory
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tion against market entrants who engage in anti-competitive prac-
tices.4 7 These competing interests within the FCC inherently lead to
tough choices over which mission should take precedence. 8 Unfor-
tunately, consumer protection has not emerged as a priority.'
49
Therefore, Congress should enact an amendment deleting section
45 (a) (2) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which currently ex-
empts "common carriers" from the FrC'sjurisdiction.'"4 In its place,
Congress should enact a new section 45(a) (2) (A) which explicitly
grants the FTC jurisdiction to receive and resolve slamming com-
plaints from consumers.'5' Additionally, Congress should enact a new
section 45(a) (2) (B), which would set up a toll-free number at the
FTC for consumers to call and file slamming complaints. 1 2 The new
section 45(a) (2) (B) should also require all local and long-distance
telephone service providers to list the toll-free FTC complaint num-
ber on consumers' billing statements. 53 The phone number should
policies implemented by FCC).
147. See47 U.S.C.A. § 258 (West Supp. 1997).
148. See Graves, supra note 145, at 418-19 (explaining that FCC is generally non-responsive
to many consumer complaints, and seems focused only on its main goal of achieving com-
pletely deregulated telecommunications market).
149. See id. (contrasting FCC's public relations efforts with those of other agencies).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2) (1994).
151. By shiftingjurisdiction over slamming complaints to the FTC, consumers would finally
have a wholly independent party to mediate slamming complaints; the FTC's mandate is lim-
ited to preventing "[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." Id. § 45(a) (1). Additionally, the FTC is
better equipped to handle many of the ancillary issues which are developing in the new tele-
communications market, such as the "bundling" of telephone services with programs that grant
customers frequent flier miles. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting that many
long-distance telephone service providers have agreements with airlines to provide frequent
flier miles for every dollar spent on telecommunications services); see also supra notes 82-84 and
accompanying text (arguing that FCC does not have authority to promulgate rules concerning
lost premiums, and that these issues must be resolved by FTC).
152. The FCC already has plans to set up a nationwide toll-free number for consumers to
file complaints about slamming. According to then-FCC Chairman Reed Hundt, "Confusion
over competition will lead to fairly significant growth in shady practices. Everyone can call up
[the toll-free number] and complain and we can monitor this." Audra D.S. Burch & Mimi
Whitefield, Look for Odd and Exotic Offers to Sign Up, NEWS & OBSERVER, Sept. 1, 1996, at D10
(alteration in original) (statement of Reed Hundt, FCC chairman). Unfortunately, the FCC
views the toll-free number more as a monitoring device than a dispute resolution tool. See id.
The FTC toll-free number should be explained to the public as a gateway to the slamming dis-
pute resolution process. See Don Oldenburg, FTC-Friendly to Consumers, Wash. Post, Dec. 10,
1997, at D5 (explaining that the FTC already has a consumer response center where aggrieved
consumers can file complaints or speak to consumer counselors who can assist with resolution
of disputes).
153. Telecommunications providers could also provide a number for their fraud depart-
ments which could assist consumers with slamming complaints. U.S. telecommunications pro-
viders could also follow the lead of their Canadian counterparts, who have established an in-
dustry ombudsman to resolve complaints between members of the telecommunications
industry. See Canada Telecom Group to Appoint Industry Ombudsman, REUTERS FIN. SERV., Oct. 8,
1996, at 1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. Such a voluntary effort on the part of
U.S. telecommunications providers would undoubtedly help government regulators ferret out
many of the most egregious slammers.
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be accompanied by a message stating: "[I] f you believe your local or
long-distance telephone service has been changed to another pro-
vider without your permission, please contact the Federal Trade
Commission's Consumer Response Center, Telecommunications
Department, at the toll-free number listed below."
15
Under this new regulatory model, the FCC can focus exclusively on
technological issues that will increase competition in the U.S. tele-
communications market, 5  while the FTC will be charged with pursu-
ing telecommunications providers that engage in anti-competitive
practices.5
Granting the FTC power to adjudicate disputes between consumers
and telecommunications providers will also allow the FTC to gain
valuable institutional experience that can be used to combat unfair
practices in other deregulated utility markets, such as the electric
power industry, that are beyond the jurisdiction of the FCC. On
January 1, 1998, California will begin the process of deregulating that
state's electric utilities. 7 As this process spreads across the rest of the
154. One of the major problems confronting slammed consumers is confusion over the
agency to call for redress. See Telphone Sevice supra note 108, at 62. In the past, many con-
sumers just called their local telephone service provider, who generally served as a neutral
third party and helped resolve disputes between consumers and slamming long-distance carri-
ers. In the deregulated market, however, consumers will no longer be able to rely on the in-
cumbent local telephone company for assistance because it will likely be competing with other
providers for both local and long-distance service. Thus, it is imperative that slammed con-
sumers have an easily accessible third party to contact. By placing the FTC toll-free number on
every telephone billing statement, consumers will, in most cases, have the information that they
need to resolve slamming complaints.
155. See Cindy Skrzycki, New Deregulation Game Leaves the FCC With Tough Calls, WASH. POST,
Feb. 16, 1996, at BI (discussing massive increase in responsibilities placed on FCC by 1996 Act).
Over the eighteen months following the enactment of the 1996 Act, the FCC plans to issue al-
most 80 different rules. The FCC also will have to deal with the many clarifications and associ-
ated issues that will arise as a result of the new rules. "The challenge is like that faced by Lewis
and Clark." Id. (statement of then-FCC Chairman Reed Hundt). Based on this workload, the
delegation of activities unrelated to telecommunications to another agency would be a rational
choice.
156. Some commentators have argued that stricter verification procedures by LECs of long-
distance carriers' primary interexchange carrier change requests is the solution to much of the
slamming problem. SeeNicole C. Daniel, Note, A Return to Written Consent: A Proposal to the FCC
to Eliminate Slamming, 49 FED. COMM. LJ. 227, 244-48 (1996) (arguing that long-distance carri-
ers should be required to submit signed LOAs to customers' LECs before any primary interex-
change carrier change is made). Although this solution may have worked well in the old tele-
communications market, it does not consider the realities of the newly deregulated market,
where many of the same LECs that are supposed to be verifying LOAs will also be soliciting cus-
tomers. Under the provisions of the 1996 Act, the LEC/long-distance carrier distinction will
begin to fade, and along with it, the impartiality of LECs in resolving disputes among long-
distance carriers. When these distinctions begin to blur, the only truly independent parties will
be federal regulatory agencies like the FTC, state PUCs, and state attorneys general. See Te-
phone Service, supra note 109, at 62 (stating that telecommunications providers will soon try to
sign consumers up for their entire telephone service package, making it more difficult for con-
sumers to resolve slamming problems).
157. See Dan Richard & Melissa Lavinson, Something for Everyone: The Politics of California's
New Law on Electric Restructuring, 134 No. 21 Pub. Util. Fort. 37, 39 (detailing changes during
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United States through additional state and federal deregulation legis-
lation, consumers must have access to an impartial party that can as-
sist in the resolution of disputes involving formerly regulated utilities.
The TDDRA model"s provides ample evidence that such a bifurcated
regulatory framework can work successfully in a new telecommunica-
tions market where services are bundled into packages containing
both communications and non-communications related services. 5 9
CONCLUSION
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 presents a comprehensive
blueprint for many of the technical and regulatory changes that will
occur in the U.S. telecommunications market as the U.S. enters an
era of free competition. Unfortunately, while the 1996 Act presents
fresh ideas for managing new technologies and services, it represents
a step backward for consumer protection. For competition to flour-
ish in the new, deregulated market, consumers must feel confident
that they will be free to choose services from the telecommunications
provider that best suits their needs. When cases of unfair competi-
tion and trade practices arise, regulatory agencies must be available
to provide fair and equitable remedies. The 1996 Act and proposed
FCC regulatory measures do not provide the assurances necessary to
garner public confidence in the new market. Therefore, Congress
should amend the 1996 Act to protect consumers from the unfair
practices of unscrupulous telecommunications providers. With deci-
sive action, Congress can finally disconnect the slammers, instead of
hanging up on consumers.
California's electric utility deregulation transition period from January 1, 1998 to December
31, 2001). The unauthorized conversion of electric service is generally referred to as
"shocking." See Vicki Torres, Small Firms are Latest Victims of Phone Switching, L.A. Times, Sept.
10, 1997, at D5.
158. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text (discussing bifurcated regulatory process
established by TDDRA, in which FCC has jurisdiction over technical aspects of the pay-per-call
industry and FTC has jurisdiction over advertising practices associated with those services).
159. See Slamming Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 3050, 105th
Cong. (establishing a bifurcated system for the resolution of slamming complaints where the
FCC would get verification procedures and the FTC would regulate "unfair and deceptive acts
and practices in any advertisements" for telecommunication services).

